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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 920346-CA 
v. % 
THOMAS C. JACKSON, % Priority No. 15 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are determinative of the issues in this case: 
Utah Code Ann. (1990) 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution 
for offense out of same episode. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted 
in a finding of not guilty by the trier of facts 
or in a determination that there was insufficient 
evidence to warrant conviction. A finding of 
guilty of a lesser included offense is an 
acquittal of the greater offense even though the 
conviction for the lesser included offense is 
subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated. 
77-18a-l. Appeals - When proper. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal[.] 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 26. Appeals. 
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal[.] 
The following points are submitted in reply to the 
arguments presented in defendant's responsive brief. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING WAS A DISMISSAL AND 
NOT AN "ACQUITTAL" BECAUSE IN A JURY TRIAL 
ONLY THE JURY, AS TRIER OF FACT, CAN ACQUIT, 
WHEREAS THE TRIAL COURT, ON A MOTION TO 
DISMISS FOR FAILURE OF THE STATE TO PRESENT A 
PRIMA FACIE CASE, CAN ONLY MAKE A RULING OF 
LAW. 
Defendant argues that the trial court's granting of his 
motion for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case 
acted as an "acquittal," and not a dismissal, citing State v. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983), and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-403 (1990), in support. In making his claim, defendant 
misconstrues the legal distinction between an acquittal and an 
dismissal and the circumstances in which one or the other 
properly identifies the type of ruling rendered. 
In Musselman, the defendant, a lawyer, was charged with 
forgery and theft and, in the alternative, theft by deception, 
all as a result of his having dismissed his client's civil suit 
and endorsed a settlement check made to both him and his client 
without the client's authority and against the client's wishes. 
At the close of the state's case the defendant moved to have all 
counts dismissed. The trial court, sitting without a jury, 
granted the motion as to the theft charge, but denied the motion 
as to the forgery charge. However, at the close of all the 
evidence, the trial court also granted defendant's renewed motion 
to dismiss the forgery charge on its legal determination that a 
lawyer cannot be guilty of forgery in signing his client's name 
to documents relating to the client's lawsuit. Id. at 1064. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the 
2 
threshold question of whether the state could appeal the trial 
court's "dismissal," recognizing, as defendant here correctly 
notes, that "[t]he label attached to a ruling by a trial judge is 
not determinative of whether the termination of a criminal 
prosecution is an acquittal." Ibid. See also State v. Workman, 
806 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991); State v. Willard, 801 P.2d 189, 191 (Utah App. 
1990). Explaining first that "[a] ruling that constitutes a 
factual resolution in favor of the defendant on one or more of 
the elements of the offense charged is an acquittal," the court 
upheld the trial court's dismissal of the theft count because it 
was based on its finding of insufficient evidence of intent, and 
was thus an "acquittal" and not a "dismissal." Musselman, 667 
P.2d at 589. In accordance with the same rationale, the supreme 
court held that the trial court's dismissal of the forgery count 
was appealable by the state because the trial court's ruling was 
made as a "matter of law" and before it ruled on the sufficiency 
of evidence to convict. Id. at 1065 (emphasis in original). 
It is clear from the supreme court's opposed rulings on 
the two counts that the distinction between the trial court's 
function as trier of fact in a bench trial in the first instance, 
and its authority to make a ruling of law in an appropriate 
circumstance in the second, is crucial in determining whether a 
ruling is to be recognized, either as an "acquittalM or a 
"dismissal". 
Musselman was a bench trial, in which the trial court 
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necessarily acted as trier of fact* Therefore, its "dismissal" 
of the theft count based on the insufficiency of evidence to 
prove intent was necessarily a factual resolution in favor of the 
defendant on one of the elements of the offense, and thus 
properly an "acquittal," from which the state had no statutory 
authority to appeal. On the other hand, the trial court's 
"dismissal" of the forgery charge was based on a ruling of law, a 
ruling properly forming the basis of a dismissal and from which 
the state did have authority to appeal.1 
Interpreting the scope of section 76-1-403(2), this 
Court in State v. Larsen, 834 P.2d 586 (Utah App. 1992), stated: 
An acquittal is based on the assessment of 
the evidence, and in a jury trial, "[i]t is 
within the exclusive province of the jury to 
judge the credibility of the witness and the 
weight of the evidence." State v. Howell, 
649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). 
. . . . 
. . . Only where the trial court is the 
factfinder does its assessment of the 
evidence amount to an acquittal, and the 
State may not appeal in that situation. 
Id. at 589 (state was authorized under section 77-18a-l(2) to 
appeal arrest of judgment and judgment of acquittal after the 
jury returned a guilty verdict) (emphasis added). 
In this case the trial court was not sitting as trier 
1
 In Musselman, the court reviewed whether the state had 
authority to appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 76-35-26(c) (1953 as 
amended) (repealed and readopted as rule 26, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure) which was replaced by Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l (Supp. 
1992). However, the State's right to appeal "from a final judgment 
of dismissal," is identical under both statutes. 
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of fact, and thus had no authority to weigh the evidence for the 
purpose of making a "factual resolution . . . on one or more of 
the elements of the offense charged." It is implicit that only 
the trier of fact makes "factual resolutions" because only the 
trier of fact weighs the evidence. To do otherwise would mean 
that the trial court was free to invade the province of the jury 
at will, a proposition Utah's appellate courts have consistently 
rejected. See State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982); 
State v. Myers, 606 P.2d 250, 251 (Utah 1980); Larsen, 834 P.2d 
at 589. When a trial court which does not sit as the trier of 
fact grants a motion to dismiss, it has not engaged in a weighing 
of the evidence because evaluation of a motion to dismiss based 
on the state's failure to make a prima facie case first requires 
that the trial court make that evaluation without considering the 
defendant's evidence. In such a case the trial court is simply 
asked, taking the evidence and the reasonable inferences 
inferable from it in a light most favorable to the state, to 
determine whether there exists any evidence upon which a 
reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty of the offense 
charge beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 
63, 74, 157 P.2d 258, 263 (1945) (Wolfe, J., concurring). Thus, 
in evaluating a motion to dismiss, the trial court is not asked 
to make a factual resolution because, in a jury trial, that is 
not its jurisprudential function. Rather, it makes only a ruling 
of law. Such a ruling, under Musselman, is properly regarded as 
"dismissal," which is expressly appealable under section 77-18a-
5 
l(2)(a). 
Defendant also argues that Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(2) 
(1990) defines "acquittal" so as to preclude the State's appeal 
(Defendant's Brief at Point). Section 76-1-403(2) provides: 
"There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding 
of not guilty by the trier of facts or in a determination that 
there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction.M 
[Emphasis added.] 
Section 76-1-403(2) discusses an "acquittal" in the 
context of double jeopardy.2 The portion of the statute upon 
which defendant relies (emphasized, above) can only refer, not to 
a trial court in a jury trial, but to a final determination of 
insufficient evidence, such as would be rendered by an appellate 
court following a final decision on the merits. See Musselman, 
667 P.2d at 1065 n.3 (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 
98 S. Ct. 2151 (1978), wherein the Supreme Court held that the 
government could not retry a defendant appealing from the denial 
of a motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of evidence 
when the reviewing court has found insufficient evidence to 
convict). 
Recognizing that the relied-upon phrase of section 
76-1-403 applies to a different procedural context, i.e., one in 
which a decision from a reviewing court determines that there was 
insufficient evidence to warrant an actual conviction, this Court 
2
 Section 76-1-403 is captioned: "Former prosecution 
barring subsequent prosecution for offense out of same episode." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (1990). 
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should find the trial court's dismissal in this case neither bars 
the State's appeal or a retrial. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT MADE AN ERROR OF LAW 
IN FINDING THE STATE HAD FAILED TO MAKE A 
PRIMA FACIE CASE, DEFENDANT MAY BE RETRIED 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE. 
Defendant argues that this appeal violates the double 
jeopardy clause of the United States and Utah Constitutions and, 
therefore, the State is barred from appealing the trial court's 
dismissal of the case. In support of his argument, defendant 
relies on the following statement from Musselman; 
An appellate court, on principles deeply 
rooted in the double jeopardy clauses of the 
Utah and Federal constitutions, and by the 
very nature of the judicial process itself, 
may not reassess an acquittal even though the 
acquittal was made under an incorrect 
application of the law or an improper 
determination of the facts. United States v. 
Martin Linen Supply Co., supra. Once a 
criminal charge has resulted in an acquittal 
by the trier of fact, the prohibition against 
double jeopardy prevents that determination 
from ever again being challenged. It is of 
no consequence that the determination was 
made as a matter of law by a directed verdict 
of acquittal, or as a matter of fact by the 
trier of fact. See, e.g., Tibbs v. Florida, 
457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982); United States v. 
Martin Linen Supply Co., supra: United States 
v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). Furthermore, 
for an appellate court to render an opinion 
on appeal from an acquittal would be to 
render an advisory opinion, which is beyond 
our power. See State v. Overson, [26 Utah 2d 
313, 489 P.2d 110 (1971)]. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1065 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
This statement makes clear that the double jeopardy 
clauses of both the Utah and United States Constitutions, on 
7 
general constitutional grounds and as applicable to advisory 
opinions, is applicable only with respect to an acquittal by the 
trier of fact, discussed above. Since, as argued in Point I of 
this reply brief, this is an appeal from a dismissal, and not an 
acquittal, defendant's arguments are misplaced. 
However, even if there is statutory authorization for 
the State to appeal the dismissal of all the theft counts, it 
does not necessarily follow that [the court] may consider the 
merits of the appeal. Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1065. "An 
appellate court may not address the merits of a criminal appeal 
if a reversal would require a retrial that would be barred by the 
double jeopardy clause." Ibid, (citations omitted). 
"It is well established in Utah that jeopardy attaches 
when an accused is put on trial in a court of competent 
jurisdiction, upon a valid indictment (or information), and a 
jury has been sworn and impaneled." State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 
354, 358 (Utah 1979). In this case there is no doubt that 
jeopardy had attached. "It is not, however, necessarily true 
that a retrial is barred by the double jeopardy clause in all 
cases once jeopardy has attached. When . . . a conviction is 
reversed on appeal for errors of law in the trial of the case, a 
defendant may be retried notwithstanding the double jeopardy 
clause." Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1065. 
In this case the trial court's dismissal of the State's 
case for failure to make a prima facie case of theft was a ruling 
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of law. See State v. Rivenburqh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 110, 355 P.2d 
689, 698-99 (1960) ("[U]pon a motion to dismiss or to direct a 
verdict of not guilty for lack of evidence [] the trial court 
does not consider the weight of the evidence . . ., but 
determines the naked legal proposition of law . • • ,M quoting 
State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 286, 272 P.2d 195, 198 
(1954)). Thus, this case is excepted from the operation of the 
double jeopardy clause. 
POINT III 
THE STATE PRESENTED MORE THAN SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO MAKE A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF THEFT. 
In challenging the sufficiency of the State's case, 
defendant essentially argues that, as to the first instance in 
which defendant's acts were witnessed, the States's witnesses had 
no personal knowledge of any fuel being taken, never heard the 
fuel pump running and that the fuel nozzle was too large for 
defendant's fuel tank. As to the second occasion on which 
defendant's acts were witnessed, defendant's principal argument 
was that Mr. Haws, superintendant on the job, acknowledged on 
cross examination that defendant might have been mistaken about 
whether he thought he had a right to take fuel for company use 
(Defendant's Brief at 9-11). 
"In order to submit a question to the jury, it is 
necessary that the prosecution present some evidence of every 
element needed to make out a cause of action•" Noren, 704 P.2d 
568, 570 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 
1976)); State v. Striebv, 790 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah App. 1990), 
9 
cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
Defendant does not mention that during the first 
instance witnesses saw defendant throw the fuel hose to the 
ground and reach around to where the fuel pump was located as he 
became aware of their approach (T. 98, 103-04, 115-16, 119). On 
the second occasion he was seen with a funnel in the fuel tank 
and the pump was running (Tl 130, 154, 172, 178). As soon as he 
became aware that he was being observed, he hung up the hose and 
shut off the pump (T. 131, 154, 173). 
Defendant completely ignores testimony from two 
witnesses, including a police officer, that defendant admitted 
"taking" the fuel during each week of his employment. Most 
importantly, defendant completely ignores that whether or not he 
might have been in doubt about whether he had permission to take 
fuel for company purposes, there was undisputed testimony that he 
admitted that he had been taking fuel, not to reimburse himself 
for on-the-job expenses, but for travel expense to and from the 
jobsite for which he had never been given permission (T. 162-64, 
192). On this fact alone there was sufficient evidence of theft 
to submit the case to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully 
requests this Court to reverse the trial court's dismissal of 
10 
counts III through XV and XVIII of the amended information and to 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
u^T. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this X day of March, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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